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Abstract 
This paper explores the effects of product and labour market regulation on growth 
in total factor productivity (TFP) using panel data from 1974–2003 for 18 OECD 
countries. Our regressions are specified so that labour and product market 
regulations can affect productivity both individually and in combination. While 
noting that the results are sensitive to the measure of labour market regulation 
used, we find some support for the hypothesis that lower initial levels of regulation 
are associated with higher TFP growth over subsequent years, and that labour and 
product market deregulation have more of an effect in combination. It also appears 
that product market deregulation has a larger positive effect on productivity growth 
the further a country is from the technological frontier. 
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PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: THE EFFECT OF MARKET 
REGULATIONS 
Christopher Kent and John Simon 
1.  Introduction 
During the late 1990s some countries experienced a productivity surge that many 
suggested was driven by information technology. Despite the attention it received, 
this productivity revolution was relatively limited in geographical scope. A small 
group of OECD countries (including Australia, Canada, Sweden and the US) 
experienced a sizeable step-up in their productivity growth in the 1990s   
(Figure 1).1 For these countries, average total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
within the business sector rose by between 0.4 and 1.2 percentage points compared 
with the previous decade. However, at the same time, TFP growth rates declined 
across much of Europe. 
Explanations for the productivity surge have focused on the production of, or 
investment in, information and communications technology (ICT).2 Looking 
across a sample of OECD countries, there is clearly a positive correlation between 
expenditure on ICT (relative to GDP) over the 1990s and the change in TFP 
growth from the late 1980s to the late 1990s (Figure 2). Importantly, the Australian 
experience demonstrates that it was not necessary to produce ICT, as had been 
thought, in order to reap some of its productivity benefits. Unlike the United States 
and most of the other ‘high-tech’ countries, Australia had no significant ICT 
production sector. 
                                           
1  This paper focuses on the 18 OECD countries for which relevant data are readily available: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. For a description of data and sources see Section 3 and Appendix A. 
2  An influential paper by Oliner and Sichel (2000) attributed around two-thirds of the step-up in 
labour productivity growth in the US over the 1990s to the use or production of ICT. In 
Australia, Simon and Wardrop (2002) estimated that IT-related capital deepening added over 
1 per cent per annum to output growth in the 1990s or about one-third of the step-up in labour 
productivity growth over the period. 2 
Figure 1: TFP – Business Sector 
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Note:  ICT spending (as a ratio to GDP) is the average for 1992–2000; TFP is the difference in five-year 
averages of annual growth ending in 1990 and 2000 
Sources:  OECD; Thomson Financial; World Information Technology and Services Alliance; authors’ calculations 
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Even if we accept that differences in ICT investment have contributed to recent 
differences in TFP growth, a critical question remains unanswered. What led some 
countries to invest so heavily in ICT while others did not? One suggested answer is 
that those countries that did not invest heavily in ICT were hamstrung by rigid 
regulation of their labour and product markets. For example, Figure 3 shows that 
countries with higher levels of product market regulation (PMR) in the early 1990s 
tended to have lower levels of ICT investment over the 1990s. Consistent with this, 
Gust and Marquez (2004) estimate an econometric model of productivity growth 
where labour and product market regulation explain ICT investment which, in turn, 
explains higher growth in labour productivity.3
This ‘two-step’ approach – from regulation to ICT investment to productivity –
ignores the potential direct link between reforms in product and labour markets 
and productivity growth. Ignoring this direct link has two potential shortcomings. 
The first is that market flexibility (or efficiency) might accelerate TFP growth 
regardless of whether a country has invested heavily in ICT or not. Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003, 2005b) and Scarpetta and Tressel (2002, 2004) argue that more 
flexible labour and product markets are critical for more rapid reorganisation of 
productive resources, thereby allowing countries to move towards the production 
frontier with greater speed. We argue that, in addition, the interaction of product 
and labour market flexibility might also be important for TFP growth. Ignoring the 
possibility that labour and product market regulation directly affect TFP growth 
also precludes an investigation of this possible interaction. 
                                           
3 Conway  et al (2006) estimate a related but different set of models which estimate the direct 
effects of product market regulations on productivity, but omit the effects of labour market 
regulation. Their first regression explains labour productivity as a function of distance from 
the technological frontier, product market regulation, and the interaction between these two 
terms. Their second regression has ICT as the dependent variable and includes various 
measures of product market regulation as explanatory variables. While the authors feel that 
the effects of product market regulation would be better identified in a framework where the 
productivity and ICT models were estimated jointly, they are reluctant to do this without a 
theoretical model of how ICT affects productivity.  
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Notes:  ICT spending (as a ratio to GDP) is the average for 1992–2000. PMR is an index ranging from 0 (least) to 
6 (most) restrictive regulations; data shown are for 1993. 
Sources:  Conway and Nicoletti (2006); World Information Technology and Services Alliance 
A second shortcoming of ignoring possible direct effects of regulation is that 
changes in TFP growth have been apparent as part of a longer-term trend that  
pre-dates the 1990s ‘tech boom’. As shown in Figure 1, the pattern of rising TFP 
growth in some countries but falling TFP growth in others has been evident in 
rolling 10-year averages of annual TFP growth for periods ending around the early 
1980s onwards. Evidence in support of a direct link between flexible markets and 
TFP growth is provided in Figure 4. This shows data for the change in annual 
average TFP growth versus the change in product market regulation. The trend 
shown suggests that a single index point reduction in the regulation index is 
associated with a rise in annual average TFP growth of about 0.3  percentage 
points. 
This paper attempts to address both of the above shortcomings. First, we use data 
spanning the past 30 years to investigate the direct effects of product and labour 
market regulation on TFP growth. Second, we specify our regressions so that 
regulations can affect productivity, both individually and in combination, through
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Notes:  This figure compares the change in PMR from 1983 to 1993 to the change in TFP growth over the  
  10 years ending in 1993 to the 10 years ending in 2003. The trend shown includes all observations except 
  that for Japan and the Netherlands. 
Sources:  Conway and Nicoletti (2006); OECD; Thomson Financial; authors’ calculations 
the interaction of product and labour market reforms. We find tentative support for 
the hypothesis that lower initial levels of regulation are associated with higher TFP 
growth over subsequent years, and that labour and product market deregulation 
have more of an effect in combination, although the significance and magnitude of 
these effects depends on the measure of labour market regulation used in the 
regressions. Also, as with any econometric modelling exercise, the presence of a 
relationship in the past does not guarantee that this same relationship will 
necessarily continue into the future. In the case of regulation and productivity, the 
relationship is likely to depend in part on the specific types of labour and product 
market deregulation pursued. Moreover, the general and relatively imprecise nature 
of most of those measures of labour market regulation that are both readily 
available and able to be used to compare developments across countries and over 
time, makes it difficult to attempt to link our estimates to any specific types of 
labour market reforms. 6 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify the kinds of product and labour market 
regulations that we are dealing with in this paper, and the relationship between  
these regulations and what we describe as market flexibility or efficiency. We 
understand a flexible labour market as one in which there are relatively few 
obstacles to efficiently matching jobs with employees. In the labour market, many 
types of regulation can affect the rate of job matching and hence labour market 
flexibility.4 An efficient product market is one in which price signals encourage 
movement of resources into profitable opportunities and out of unprofitable ones. 
In product markets, some regulations (such as those acting as barriers to entry in 
inherently competitive markets) can restrict competition, while others (such as 
anti-monopoly laws) are necessary pre-conditions for a competitive system. Our 
interest is in product market regulations that restrict competition where 
competition is feasible. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
the literature, noting the ways in which the paper extends the existing line of 
research. Section 3 discusses the data and methodological issues and Section 4 
presents the results. Section 5 investigates the effects of using alternative measures 
of labour market regulation and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Literature Review 
Investigations of the reasons for divergent growth between countries have been 
around since the Wealth of Nations. More recent studies have been motivated by 
the phenomenon of ‘eurosclerosis’.5 For example, Drèze and Bean (1990) found 
that the effect of unemployment on wage settlements in Europe is generally weak 
and that productivity gains were quickly absorbed in higher wages. 
Blanchard  (1997) found that European countries responded to labour shocks in 
very different ways than Anglo-Saxon countries, and that this difference led to 
generally higher unemployment in Europe. The common explanation for these 
                                           
4  While there are many aspects of the employer/employee relationship that can impede job 
matching, many things external to this relationship can also impede matching (for example, 
how likely people are to relocate to fill a vacancy). While there has been a tendency for labour 
market deregulation to shift bargaining power in favour of employers, there is no necessary 
link between regulation and the relative bargaining power of different agents. 
5  For example, Bruno and Sachs (1985), Drèze and Bean (1990) and Blanchard (1997). 
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different behaviours was differences in labour market institutions. However, while 
the role of institutions was thought to be qualitatively well understood, these earlier 
papers did not directly quantify the role of institutions. 
More recent papers have directly addressed the influence of institutions on 
macroeconomic variables including productivity. In particular, papers such as 
those by Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2002) 
and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) have examined whether indices of product or 
labour market regulation can explain various measures of macroeconomic 
performance. In general, they find that overly restrictive institutions can have a 
deleterious effect on some macroeconomic outcomes, including productivity. 
Blanchard and Wolfers suggest that rigid institutions can entrench the effect of 
negative shocks. Hornstein et al show that differences in labour market institutions 
affect the changes in unemployment and wage inequality arising from a technology 
shock. Nicoletti and Scarpetta examine panel data across countries and across 
industries and show that an index of product market regulation has significant 
explanatory power for TFP growth. They argue that the ability of firms to innovate, 
adopt new technologies and reorganise productive processes depends on the extent 
of restrictive regulations in product markets, and present evidence that countries 
with fewer regulations move toward the technological frontier more quickly. 
However, they only make use of variation in the extent and speed of reforms in a 
limited way (ignoring, for example, significant changes in labour market 
regulations over time), nor does their industry-level data allow for the possibility 
that reforms matter for aggregate productivity growth via a reorganisation of 
productive activities.6
This paper adds to the literature exploring the link between productivity growth 
and labour and product market institutions, exploring similar questions to those 
posed by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and Scarpetta and Tressel (2002, 2004), 
but extending these analyses in two key respects. 
First, we use data pre-dating the ‘tech boom’ to examine the direct effects of 
product and labour market flexibility on TFP growth, both independently and in 
                                           
6  For further discussion of this paper and an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the relationship between competition and economic growth and productivity, see   
Aghion and Griffith (2005).  
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combination. Specifying our regressions this way captures an idea formalised in 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta’s  (2005a) analysis of the effect of product and labour 
market regulation on employment: that the changes in employment arising from 
deregulation in one market might depend on regulation in another. Applying this 
concept to productivity, the idea is that while reforms that are limited to (say) 
product markets may enhance competitive pressures and encourage innovation, 
without flexible labour markets the ability of firms to restructure may be restricted, 
and the entry of new firms may be limited. Similarly, labour market reforms may 
be less potent in the face of only limited product market reforms, which would 
potentially impede innovation, reorganisation and new entrants. 
Second, this paper focuses on aggregate TFP growth. As noted in   
Conway et al (2006), studies that focus on industry-level data may underestimate 
the effects of regulatory changes on aggregate productivity. This is because they 
ignore the fact that institutional changes may encourage reallocation of resources 
across industries in a way that encourages aggregate productivity growth.   
Conway et al (2006) note that the reallocation of resources across industries has to 
date played a relatively small role in explaining cross-country differences in 
aggregate productivity growth in the OECD. Even so, using aggregate data also 
allows us to capture the fact that reforms which help to spur productivity in some 
industries could have important spill-over effects for all industries by reducing the 
costs of business inputs, thereby lowering costs for new entrants.7
3.  Data and Method 
This paper uses fixed-effects panel data regressions with growth in TFP as the 
dependent variable. We examine the effects of product and labour market 
regulation on TFP growth in 18 OECD countries from 1974 to 2003.8 Appendix A 
provides detailed descriptions of our data and its sources while Table 1 summarises 
the key data. 
                                           
7  The OECD’s indices of the ‘knock-on’ effects of regulation in the non-manufacturing sector 
(Conway and Nicoletti 2006) are designed to capture these effects at a sectoral level. 
8  As discussed below, we exclude observations for Japan and the Netherlands in the 1990s from 
most of the regression analysis.  
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We run the regression with observations over three 10-year blocks. While the data 
are annual, estimating the regression over 10-year periods lets us better capture any 
relationship between TFP growth, which is quite volatile from one year to the next, 
and changes in the structure of product and labour markets, which are likely to 
have a delayed and more gradual impact on TFP growth. This is also one way to 
attempt to control for any influence of the business cycle on measured TFP growth 
(discussed further below). 
The dependent variable in our regressions is growth in TFP in the business sector. 
We calculate TFP from OECD data converted to US dollars using purchasing 
power parity exchange rates to increase cross-country comparability. Restricting 
our analysis to the business sector avoids the problems of measuring output and 
productivity in the government sector, and using an hours-based measure of labour 
inputs avoids the well-known problems with time series comparisons of heads-
based productivity estimates. An important difference between our measure of TFP 
and some others is our measure of labour’s share of income (LSI): we include an 
approximation of labour’s share of gross mixed income (GMI) in our estimate of 
LSI.9
The general specification we use for our regression analysis is a modified version 
of that in Griffith, Redding and Van Reenan (2000) and is based on a ‘catch-up’ 
theory of TFP growth. This theory suggests that, other things equal, countries 
further from the technological frontier will experience more rapid TFP growth, 
given their opportunities to adopt more advanced productive practices of those 
countries at the frontier. Following Griffith et al, we assume that TFP growth is an 
auto-regressive distributed lag (1,1) process in which the level of TFP in each 
country is co-integrated with that in the technological leader. This specification 
allows for the possibility that TFP growth rates may converge in the long run, but 
that differences in the level of TFP can persist. If we also assume long-run 
homogeneity, TFP growth in a given country at time t will be a function of TFP
 
9  Specifically, we assume that all self-employed are paid average wages. The conceptually 
correct method for calculating LSI is to sum compensation of employees (CoE), labour’s 
share of GMI and net taxes on labour. Of course, labour’s share of GMI is positive, and net 
taxes on labour are also likely to be positive (and relatively small). Hence the standard 
technique of approximating the numerator of LSI solely with CoE yields LSI estimates that 
are biased downwards. As LSI is the weight on labour inputs in calculations of TFP, bias in 




Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued next page) 
  TFP growth
(a)   Product market regulation
(b)  TFP  gap
(c)
  1983 1993  2003  1975  1983  1993  2003  1973 1983 1993 
Australia 0.41  1.05  1.80    4.0  4.0  3.2  1.5    –31.9  –30.1  –32.3 
Belgium 1.84  1.15  0.85    5.5  5.5  4.6  2.1    –34.2  –17.5  –21.1 
Canada –0.25  0.90  1.45    4.3  4.3  2.5  1.9    –3.1  –7.6  –12.9 
Denmark 0.80  0.69  0.92    5.5  5.5  4.2  1.6    –39.5  –33.0  –40.1 
Finland 2.05  1.85  2.97    5.5  5.4  4.2  2.4    –63.9  –53.6  –51.4 
France 0.73  0.79  0.92    6.0  6.0  4.9  3.0    –4.2  –0.8  –5.9 
Germany 1.22  1.04  1.26    5.2  5.1  4.2  1.7    –28.6  –19.5  –23.5 
Ireland 3.59  3.91  4.44    5.7  5.7  4.7  3.2    –80.9  –51.1  –25.5 
Italy 1.45  1.53  0.67    5.8  5.8  5.3  2.6    –24.8  –17.1  –19.0 
Japan 1.11  1.68  0.41    5.1  5.1  3.3  2.2    –38.9  –38.0  –35.4 
Netherlands 1.65 1.51  0.67    5.6  5.6  4.2  1.6    –22.2 –9.2 –8.2 
NZ –  –  1.11    4.9  4.5  3.0  2.1    –  –  –36.1 
Norway 2.41  2.01  2.28    5.5  5.5  3.6  2.3    –22.0  –6.8  0.0 
Spain 1.38  1.12  0.41    5.1  5.0  4.5  2.0    –24.9  –15.1  –16.8 
Sweden 0.56  0.97  1.92    4.5  4.5  3.3  1.9    –33.6  –31.9  –37.1 
Switzerland –  – 0.58    4.1 4.2 4.2 2.8    –  –  –42.3 
UK 1.54  1.22  1.28    4.8  4.5  2.2  1.0    –26.4  –14.6  –17.2 
US 0.28  1.23  1.59    3.7  2.7  2.2  1.4    0.0  0.0  –1.5 
Average 1.30  1.41  1.42    5.0  4.9  3.8  2.1    –28.1  –21.6  –23.7 
Notes:  (a) Ten-year average of annual growth ending in the year shown. Average for Finland and Norway begins in 1976. 
  (b) Averages of indicators of regulatory and market environment for seven energy and service industries, see Conway and Nicoletti (2006); index from
0 (least) to 6 (most) restrictive regulations. 
  (c) Difference between the log level of TFP in country i and that of the technological leader (multiplied by 100). The 1973 figure for Finland and Norway is 




Table 1: Summary Statistics (continued) 
  Days lost to labour disputes
(d) Employment protection legislation
(e) Union density
(f)
  1973  1983  1993  2003  1973  1983  1993  1973 1983 1993 
Australia 450.8  413.0  137.3  39.0  0.0  0.0  1.1  50.2  47.2  37.5 
Belgium 216.9  56.8  27.4  21.0  3.0  3.0  2.6  47.6  51.9  55.0 
Canada 570.9  563.4  159.7  151.0  –  0.6  0.6  34.6  36.6  32.8 
Denmark 550.4  114.4  31.6  37.7  0.0  0.0  1.9  62.2  80.8  77.3 
Finland 888.8  223.7  78.9  28.5  –  2.2  2.2  61.4  68.8  78.8 
France 189.7  87.5  37.6  73.8  2.7  2.7  2.9  22.1  16.0  10.1 
Germany 67.4  1.5  16.6  4.3  3.6  3.6  3.2  32.4  35.0  31.8 
Ireland 213.4  341.0  94.7  32.8  0.8  1.0  1.0  53.3  57.2  50.0 
Italy 1  001.9  699.3  146.5  121.0  0.0  4.2  3.8  43.3  45.5  39.2 
Japan 101.9  9.4  2.3  0.3  2.6  2.6  2.6  33.5  29.8  24.3 
Netherlands 45.9  20.2  11.0  21.5  3.1  3.1  2.8  36.2  31.3  25.9 
NZ 140.5  236.4  51.7  21.8  0.0  1.0  1.0  56.3  64.5  34.5 
Norway 6.6  54.1  66.8  22.2  1.6  3.1  3.0  53.2  58.1  58.0 
Spain 67.0  359.2  338.5  157.4  0.0  3.7  3.5  –  8.9  18.0 
Sweden 74.4  19.6  19.8  50.4  0.0  3.4  2.9  72.5  79.6  83.9 
Switzerland 1.0  0.5  0.1  3.8  1.3  1.3  1.3  27.8  29.6  22.9 
UK 609.2  186.3  25.2  28.0  0.4  0.5  0.5  45.5  48.0  36.1 
US 419.3  144.2  35.2  14.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  26.3  21.7  16.9 
Average 312.0  196.1  71.2  46.0  1.2  2.0  2.1  44.7  45.0  40.7 
Notes:  (d) Number of working days lost due to industrial disputes per 1 000 employees, three-year-ended average. 
  (e) Interpolated index of employment protection legislation (EPL) from Nicoletti et al (2001) backcast following Blanchard and Wolfers (1999); index from 
0 (least) to 6 (most) restrictive regulations. 
  (f) Proportion of employees who are members of a trade union expressed as a percentage. The 1973 figure for Australia is from 1976. 
Source: See  Appendix  A 12 
growth in the technological leader and the technological ‘gap’ for each country, 
which is the difference between the logged levels of TFP in country i and the 
technological leader (see Equation (1) below). 
To test the effects of regulation on TFP growth we add measures of product and 
labour market regulation on their own, in combination, and (following Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta 2003) in combination with the technology gap.10 The products of 
regulatory terms with the technology gap allow for the possibility that the effects 
of labour and product market regulations on productivity may depend on a 
country’s distance from the productive frontier. 
Our measure of product market regulation is an OECD index, which provides an 
internationally comparable measure of the degree to which government   
policies inhibit competition. This index is based on a number of sub-indices 
covering regulations related to barriers to entry (including legal and administrative 
barriers to entrepreneurship), public ownership, market structure, vertical 
integration and price controls in seven non-manufacturing industries (for more 
details see Appendix A and Conway and Nicoletti 2006). The index ranges from 
most restrictive (6) to least restrictive (0), and is an annual time series available 
from 1975–2003. We can think of this index as a ‘direct’ measure of a country’s 
economic structure, in the sense that it is directly related to a country’s economic 
regime, rather than being a consequence of that structure. 
Like most proxies, direct measures of product market competition such as these 
have both advantages and disadvantages. A significant advantage of direct 
measures of the regulatory structure is that (provided regulators do not deregulate 
opportunistically) they are more exogenous to the macroeconomic variables under 
investigation than traditional proxies such as firms’ mark-ups. Two potential 
disadvantages are that proxies based on statutes cannot adjust for the way that the 
statutes are enforced in practice, and that the regulations might be a poor proxy for 
competition because, even if enforced, they do not actually affect competition. The 
                                           
10 Griffith et al (2000) use an endogenous growth framework to derive a model of productivity 
growth incorporating R&D. Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
adapt this specification, replacing R&D in the original equation with PMR. While Griffith and 
Harrison (2004) criticise this replacement as being ad hoc, Scarpetta and Tressel and   
Nicoletti and Scarpetta do suggest mechanisms through which product market competition 
can affect the adoption of new technologies. 
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OECD indices attempt to adjust for enforcement by including some data on actual 
market structures. Also, the few direct tests of the OECD indices conducted to date 
suggest that they are correlated with traditional indicators of competition such as 
firm entry rates and sectoral mark-ups (Conway and Nicoletti 2006). 
Our preferred measure of labour market regulation (LMR) is a proxy based on the 
number of days lost in labour disputes, but we test the sensitivity of our results to 
alternative measures in Section 5. While the annual data are quite volatile, a three-
year moving average shows a trend decline across most countries, and this trend 
appears to be consistent with the variation in the extent of labour market reforms 
across countries.11 Because the approach to industrial relations reform has been 
quite different across countries, an outcome-based measure such as this may be 
better than a direct measure. For example, Wooden and Sloan (1998) show that 
while Australia and the UK adopted different approaches to labour market reform, 
they have resulted in very similar labour market outcomes. 
Both the PMR and LMR variables enter our regressions in levels rather than 
changes. With this specification, the literal interpretation of a significant negative 
relationship between a regulatory variable and TFP growth is that deregulating the 
relevant market causes a permanent increase in the growth rate of TFP. Although 
we do find such significant econometric relationships, we would caution against 
this literal interpretation. This is because it may be difficult to distinguish between 
lower levels of regulation leading to higher levels or higher growth rates of TFP 
over our sample period. 
To avoid attributing changes in the quality of labour to changes in TFP growth, we 
include two controls for changes in labour quality in our regressions. The first is 
average years of schooling, a proxy for human capital. Clearly this is imperfect as 
it measures a process (education) rather than an outcome (human capital 
formation) and does not capture post-school human capital formation. However, 
                                           
11 It is possible that there is a mechanical relationship between the days lost to labour disputes in 
one year and TFP growth in the next. Whether or not such a relationship exists depends on:  
(i) how the labour input of striking employees is measured in each country in our sample; and 
(if measured hours worked do fall as a result of industrial action) (ii) the extent to which this 
decrease in labour inputs results in a fall in output, TFP, or some combination of the two. 
Even if such a mechanical relationship does exist, its effect will be negligible as our 
dependent variable is average TFP growth over 10- or 5-year periods. 
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Bassanini, Scarpetta and Hemmings (2001) note that the specific series used in 
their paper represents an improvement upon those generally used in the 
literature.12
The second control is an employment-to-population ratio. This should capture 
variation in the quality of labour inputs arising from the employment of more or 
less productive employees over time. Various versions of this measure have been 
found to be significant in related studies.13 The choice of both the denominator and 
numerator are potentially important here. The choice of the denominator (total 
population, population aged 15 and older or population aged 15–64) affects the 
extent to which changes in an employment-to-population ratio reflect changes in 
the age structure of the population (which are not necessarily related to labour 
productivity). We choose the denominator (population aged 15–64) that is likely to 
be least susceptible to demographic changes, given our sample period. For the 
numerator we choose business sector rather than total employment, although there 
are potential problems with either measure. Total employment would fall if public 
sector employment fell with unchanged business sector employment, which we 
would expect to have only a tenuous relationship with the marginal productivity of 
employees in the business sector, our sector of interest. Conversely, we might 
expect the marginal productivity of new entrants into private sector employment to 
differ depending on whether they came from outside the labour force, 
unemployment, or the public sector, but our measure will only register an increase 
in the employment rate regardless of the origin of the entrants. 
Measured TFP growth may be influenced by the state of the business cycle, and 
business cycles are not perfectly synchronised across countries. It follows that 
international comparisons of productivity growth may be distorted unless one 
controls for the business cycle in each country. This can be done by including an 
indicator of the cycle as an independent variable. Alternatively, the dependent 
variable could be smoothed to remove its cyclical component. Skoczylas and 
                                           
12  For an examination of the importance of human capital in closing Australia’s labour 
productivity gap with the US, see Dolman, Parham and Zheng (2007). 
13 For example, Belorgey, Lecat and Maury (2004) find a negative association between labour 
productivity and the change in the employment rate, where the denominator of the latter is the 
total population. Gust and Marquez (2004) find a negative association between business 
sector labour productivity growth and the change in the ratio of total employment to the 
population aged 15 and older. 
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Tissot’s  (2005) analysis of cross-country labour and multifactor productivity 
compares these methods. While they favour the former, the authors note that for 
most countries in their sample the results of each method are broadly similar. We 
make use of both approaches in this paper. When using data over 5- or 10-year 
blocks, much of the effect of the cycle is controlled for indirectly. We also include 
an output gap as an indicator of the cycle in our regressions. Our gap is the 
difference between the natural logarithms of actual and trend business sector 
output, where trend is constructed with an HP filter. The standard endpoint 
problem is partially mitigated by including three years of OECD forecasts for 
business sector output when smoothing these series.14
In summary, we estimate regressions based on the following general formulation: 
 
it i it
it it it it it
it it it it it
Lt it it it it it
T outputgap
epop hk LMR PMR tfpgap
LMR tfpgap PMR tfpgap tfpgap
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where:  it tfp Δ  and  Lt tfp Δ  are average annual growth in TFP for country i and the 
leading country L over the time period, t, in question; PMRit–1 is the lagged level of 
the product market regulations index; LMRit–1 is the lagged level of working days 
lost to labour disputes (smoothed by taking averages over three-year periods); 
tfpgapit–1 is the level of the gap between TFP in country i and the leading country; 
hkit–1 is the lagged level of average years of schooling; epopit–1 is the lagged level 
of the ratio of employment to the working-age population; outputgapit is the 
average annual value of the output gap over the period t; and T is a time trend. The 
time periods are the three 10-year blocks ending in 1983, 1993 and 2003. The 
regulation variables, TFP gap, human capital and employment-to-population ratio 
are all measured on a period-ended basis, that is, the year just prior to the start of 
the 10-year block t; the exception to this is for the first 10-year period for which 
the PMR index is only available for 1975. 
                                           
14 We also estimated regressions below using output gaps from the OECD’s Economic Outlook 
No 78 database. Their results were very similar. 
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4.  Results 
The first point to note is that regressions based on the full sample (results not 
reported) show that residuals for Japan and the Netherlands in the 10-year period 
ending in 2003 stand out as being particularly large.15 This is because these 
countries experienced sizeable declines in PMR from 1983 to 1993, but also 
experienced among the largest declines in average TFP growth from the 10 years 
ending in 1993 to the 10 years ending in 2003. In what follows we exclude 
observations for the Japan and the Netherlands in the 1990s. The exclusion of 
outlying observations is fairly common in the literature, in part reflecting problems 
with errors in variables and omitted variables that may be especially relevant to 
some observations (see, for example, Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003). For Japan, the 
after-effects of the financial bubble are likely to have played an important role. For 
the Netherlands, wage moderation enabled a very large rise in participation 
through the 1990s (without a commensurate increase in labour market flexibility), 
which was associated with a sharp decline in labour and total factor productivity 
(for a discussion of the Dutch case, see Naastepad and Kleinknecht 2002 and   
Bell 2004). 
The key results of estimating a number of variants of Equation (1) using OLS 
appear in Table 2. Model 1 is a basic regression with only the PMR and LMR 
measures (and their interactive term) included. The coefficients on the LMR and 
interactive terms are significant by themselves. The coefficient on PMR is not – its 
p-value is 0.108, but excluding it from the model leads to a drop in the fit of the 
model of around 20 per cent. The PMR variable is significant in the absence of the 
LMR and interactive terms (results not shown), and its coefficient is of a similar 
order of magnitude as per Model 1. 
Because of the interactive term, the interpretation of the marginal contributions of 
reforms in labour and product markets depends on the level of the other regulatory 
variable. This can be seen in Figure 5, where changes in the vertical height of the 
surface show the estimated changes in TFP growth for given changes in LMR and 
PMR. From the initial to the most recent observations of PMR and LMR included 
in our panel, most countries moved from points near the front and left of the 
                                           
15 The residual for Canada in the 1970s is also large, but exclusion of this observation makes no 
substantial difference to the following results. 
 17 
surface, to points towards the right and rear of the surface. Within much of the 
region of reforms actually observed, the shape of the surface shows that 
deregulation in labour and product markets had large effects when undertaken in 
combination.16
Table 2: Panel Regression Results for Growth in TFP – Equation (1) 
Fixed-effects estimation, three 10-year blocks ending in 1983, 1993 and 2003 
Variables Lag  Model 
    1 2 3  4
(a)
PMR   t -1 –0.22  0.12   –0.23** 
LMR   t -1 –0.009***  –0.016***  –0.010***  –0.008*** 
PMR*LMR   t -1 0.0016*** 0.0030***  0.0019***  0.0016***
Human capital   t -1   0.068     
Employment/population t -1   –0.070     
TFP growth leader  t    0.042    
TFP gap   t -1   –0.087**  –0.085***   
TFP gap*PMR   t -1   0.015*  0.015***   
TFP gap*LMR   t -1   –0.0003    
TFP gap*PMR*LMR   t -1   6.4x10
–5   
Output gap  t      –0.21*** 




(b)  0.34  0.57  0.49  0.30 
p-value for rejecting  















Notes:  ***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, 
respectively, using robust standard errors. All models exclude observations from 1994 to 2003 for Japan
and the Netherlands. PMR – index from 0 (least) to 6 (most) restrictive. LMR – days lost to labour 
disputes per 1 000 employees. 
  (a) Based on five 5-year blocks, ending in 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003. 
  (b) The R
2 within does not take account of the explanatory power from the constant. 
                                           
16 The estimated marginal effect of labour market deregulation on TFP growth is positive for 
values of PMR below 5.4. Between 1975 and 1993, average PMR fell from 5.0 to 3.8, so the 
estimated marginal contribution of changes in LMR has been positive for most countries over 
the sample period. The estimated marginal effect of product market deregulation is positive 
for values of LMR below 138  days lost per 1 000 employees. Over 1973–1993, average 
working days lost fell from 312  to  71, so that the marginal effect of product market 
deregulation is estimated to have become positive for most countries during the sample 
period.
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LMR – days lost
PMR – index
 
Notes:  This figure shows the percentage point contributions of changes in regulatory variables to TFP growth. 
Only the change in the level of TFP growth is meaningful in this case. 
Source: authors’  calculations 
Model 2 is the more comprehensive specification, with human capital, the 
employment-to-population ratio, the TFP gap and related interactive terms with the 
regulatory variables all included.17 The TFP gap by itself is significant and enters 
with a negative coefficient. As all TFP gaps are negative or zero, this implies that 
the further a country is behind the lead country, the faster will be its average TFP 
growth over the next decade. While PMR is not significant on its own, its 
interactions with both LMR and the TFP gap variables are both significant. The 
coefficient on the interactive term between PMR and TFP gaps is positive, 
implying that the technology gap tends to have closed more quickly when product 
market regulations were less restrictive. Because of the interactive terms, the 
                                           
17 Although the time series was too short for inclusion in the 10-year regression, we estimated 
the regression based on 5-year blocks (see below) with an indicator of R&D expenditure, 
which was insignificant (results not shown). Econometric research into the effects of R&D 
expenditure on TFP growth (for example, Scarpetta and Tressel 2004) suggests that the 
effects depend on the type of technology in a given industry and hence may be difficult to 
detect in an aggregate analysis. 
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interpretation of the marginal contributions of reforms in labour and product 
markets depends on the level of the other regulatory variable, and the level of the 
technology gap. To interpret these interactions, we remove the insignificant 
variables from Model 2 to obtain the parsimonious Model 3. 
The estimated contribution to TFP growth of changes in the regulatory 
environment can be illustrated with a surface similar to that of Figure 5 for each of 
three different TFP gaps: large; intermediate; and small. These surfaces are shown 
in Figure  6, where changes in the height of the surfaces show the estimated 
changes in TFP growth for given changes in LMR and PMR, conditional on the 
TFP gap. 
For all three TFP gaps, the contribution of labour market deregulation is positive 
so long as the product market is not too heavily regulated (a PMR index of less 
than about 5.3), and the contribution is larger at lower levels of product market 
regulation. The contribution of product market deregulation depends on the levels 
of both LMR and the technology gap. For each gap, the estimated marginal 
contribution of product market deregulation is negative for higher levels of labour 
market regulation; the level of LMR needed to make a marginal change in PMR 
positive falls as the technology gap closes. For moderate to low levels of labour 
market regulation, product market reforms are estimated to make a positive 
contribution to TFP growth. This contribution is larger the lower is labour market 
regulation, and the larger is the TFP gap. 
Model 1 is fairly robust to the inclusion of an output gap or the exclusion of each 
individual country from the sample, although the coefficient on PMR is not as 
stable as the others. While the coefficients on LMR and the interactive term are 
quite robust, adding a time trend or time dummies roughly halves the coefficient 
on PMR. The same tests18 for Model 2 reveal that the coefficients on PMR, human 
capital and TFP growth in the leading country are generally rather unstable. This is 
probably driven in part by the high correlation between some of the variables in the 
                                           
18 With the exception of adding time dummies or trends. Because the average TFP growth of the 
leader is constant across countries, it can be expressed as a function of the time dummies, 
giving a near-perfect dependence between a subset of the explanatory variables. Also, the 
correlation between the time trend and average TFP growth of the leader is extremely high, so 
including a time trend risks generating spurious results and introducing yet more collinearity 
into Model 2. 
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Figure 6: Estimated Contribution to TFP Growth – Model 3 
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LMR – days lost
PMR – index
TFP gap = –10
 
Notes:  These figures show the percentage point contributions of changes in regulatory variables to TFP growth. 
Only the change in the level of TFP growth is meaningful in this case. 
Source: authors’  calculations 
model (in particular between PMR and human capital) which makes their 
coefficient estimates sensitive to small changes in the sample. The parsimonious 
Model 3 is robust to the inclusion of an output gap, the inclusion of time trends or 
time dummies, and to the exclusion of individual countries from the sample. The 
coefficient on the output gap was not itself significant in any of the models. 
Our specification of Equation (1) suggests two further robustness checks. Strictly 
speaking, when Equation (1) includes the technology gap terms it is only relevant 
for countries that are not the technological leader. We therefore follow   
Griffith et al (2000) and re-estimate Models 2 and 3 excluding Norway and the US 
(results not shown). Model 3 is completely robust to their exclusion and Model 2 is 
generally robust. If our sample were larger, we would include one further check: 
re-estimating Models 2 and 3 with instrumental variables (IV) to confirm that any 
downward bias arising from the inclusion of the technology gap in the fixed-effects 
specification is small as theory suggests. Unfortunately, given the instruments 
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available to us, IV reduces our sample size so much as to make estimation 
unreliable.19
We also examined results based on using data in 5-year blocks (Model 4 in 
Table 2). This has the advantage of more degrees of freedom by greater use of the 
time dimension, but at the expense of a potential increase in measurement error. To 
account for the impact of the business cycle on measured TFP growth we included 
the output gap in regressions. The main difference between these and the 10-year 
block regressions is that the TFP gap and its interactive terms were no longer 
significant. The results for the parsimonious Model 4 is very much like that of 
Model 1 (based on 10-year blocks), though with PMR now significant in its own 
right. This was not the case in the presence of time trends or time dummies, though 
the time trend was not significant in the presence of the PMR variable and the 
inclusion of the trend added only marginally to the explanatory power of the 
model. 
                                           
19 Nickell (1981) showed that a fixed-effects model with a lagged dependent variable generates 
estimates that are biased downwards when the number of time periods (T) is small.   
Judson and Owen (1999) showed that, for the kinds of panels commonly found in 
macroeconomics (relatively more time periods and fewer cross-sections than in the typical 
microeconomic panel), the size of this bias can be between 3 and 20 per cent of the true size 
of the coefficient even when T is as big as 30. While it would still be desirable to check that 
the bias is small in our case, Equation (1) is a non-standard example of this type of bias 
problem because, rather than being a lagged dependent variable, the technology gap that 
appears on the RHS of Equation  (1) is related to the lagged dependent variable by 
construction. This means that it is not feasible to use existing methods such as bias correction 
(Bruno 2005) or the generalised method of moments to generate unbiased estimates for 
Equation (1). Hence IV is the only technique open to us, but, given the available instruments, 
it reduces our sample size so much as to make estimation unreliable. Fortunately it is likely 
that the differences between our model and a standard lagged dependent variable fixed-effect 
model make any potential bias even smaller. For example, like Scarpetta and Tressel (2004) 
and Griffith et al (2000), we use different indices of TFP on the LHS and RHS of 
Equation (1); the index on the RHS is a superlative index that permits comparison of the 
levels of TFP across countries. Although the underlying data are the same, the indices are 
constructed differently so any correlations and bias would probably be smaller than would be 
the case in a more standard regression with a lagged dependent variable, other things equal. 
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5.  Alternative Measures of Labour Market Regulation 
This section discusses some alternative measures of labour market regulations and 
presents regression results where these are used in place of the working days lost 
(WDL) measure. A measure of labour market regulations is included to capture the 
degree of flexibility of a country’s labour market at a given point in time, where 
we understand a ‘flexible’ labour market as one in which employees can be 
matched with jobs in an efficient manner. The rationale for using working days lost 
per 1 000 employees as a measure of labour market regulation is that there is likely 
to be an indirect, though perhaps imprecise, link between this variable and labour 
market flexibility. 
There are several alternative measures, but each has its own problems. One 
alternative is union density, which measures the proportion of employees who are 
union members (Table 1). Again, while there may be an indirect relationship 
between union density and the rate of job matching, the linkages may be somewhat 
tenuous. This is partly because, regardless of the proportion of employees who are 
union members, it is the structure of wage bargaining prevailing in a given country 
that determines the proportion of employees actually covered by union-negotiated 
wage bargains (this proportion is called ‘union coverage’). Furthermore, because 
the gap between union density and union coverage differs across countries, union 
density is not a good proxy for coverage.20
Both WDL and union density measure an outcome of the regulatory structure of 
the labour market rather than measuring that regulatory structure directly. While 
outcomes-based measures might reflect a broader range of structural features 
affecting the labour market than more direct measures do, measuring outcomes can 
lead to problems of endogeneity. Of course we have tried to address these, at least 
in part, by an appropriate lag structure in the regression analysis. 
                                           
20 For example, in France in 1990, about 10 per cent of employees were union members but 
union coverage was around 90 per cent. The figures for the US were 16 and 18 per cent, 
respectively (Nickell and Nunziata 2000). While data for union coverage are too sparse to be 
useful, the summary indicator of wage bargaining presented in Elmeskov, Martin and 
Scarpetta (1998) does measure a related concept for some countries over most of the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
 24 
In contrast to these outcomes-based measures, the summary indicator of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) produced by the OECD measures one 
aspect of labour market regulation – the procedural and monetary costs associated 
with legislation governing dismissals. This index is comparable across countries 
and time,21 with a higher number indicating stricter legislation. To date, the indices 
are only available for three time periods: the late 1980s, the late 1990s and 2003. 
We therefore follow Blanchard and Wolfers’ (1999) method of backcasting and 
interpolating an EPL to create a long time series for this indicator (see Appendix A 
for further details). 
The theory that stricter EPL makes employment adjustment more costly for firms 
(and hence impedes matching) is fairly robust across the literature.22 However, as a 
proxy for labour market regulation more generally, EPL suffers from the fact that it 
may not be the most significant determinant of flexibility, so that changes in EPL 
strictness might not reflect changes in the overall degree of flexibility. For 
example, employment protection can be strengthened as other key features of the 
labour market – such as the structure of wage bargaining – are made more flexible. 
If the increased flexibility arising from the other changes more than offsets the fall 
in flexibility from increased EPL, using EPL as a proxy for labour market 
flexibility would mistakenly suggest flexibility had decreased.23 From an empirical 
perspective, there is less within-country variation in this EPL than in WDL (the 
average within-country coefficients of variation are 0.53  and 0.87  respectively), 
although this is only problematic if variation in the EPL understates the ‘true’ 
variation in the flexibility of the labour market. 
                                           
21 The statistical techniques used to combine the raw data also yield cardinal indices. See   
Annex 2.A1 in OECD (2004) for a detailed description of the construction method. 
22 The existence and magnitude of these effects in practice has been a far more contentious 
issue. See OECD (2004) for a recent cross-country analysis of the effects of EPL on labour 
market outcomes. 
23 Indeed, for Australia, the EPL measure we use suggests that the labour market was more 
regulated in recent years compared with the 1980s, despite the significant reform over this 
period (see Dawkins 2000 for a discussion of these labour market reforms). 
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The results of re-estimating Models 1 and 2 with union density and EPL appear in 
Table 3.24 When Model  1 is re-estimated using EPL as the LMR variable, the 
model is not significant overall and the p-value on EPL is very high (0.984). The 
model is generally robust to excluding individual countries, with the exception of 
the UK and the US. When EPL is replaced with union density (UD), the coefficient 
on UD is not significant; the model itself is also not significant overall, while the 
coefficient on PMR is not particularly robust to the exclusion of individual 
countries from the sample. The fit of the EPL and UD models is poorer than that 
based on WDL (as indicated by much lower R
2 values). 
Model 2 with EPL is significant overall (at the 10 per cent level) but few 
coefficients are significant by themselves. The effects of product and labour 
market regulation on TFP are evident in the parsimonious specifications (Model 3) 
based on these alternative labour market variables. However, Model 3 based on 
EPL suggests that the net effect of a one unit decrease in EPL on TFP growth is 
positive only for countries that are closer to the technological frontier (that is, once 
TFP gaps are smaller than about –24). Model 3 based on UD implies that, for a 
country with an intermediate technology gap, a simultaneous move from a PMR of 
5 and UD of 50 per cent to a PMR of 3 and UD of 20 per cent is associated with a 
rise in TFP growth of 1.2 percentage points, other things equal. 
Overall, these results suggest that conclusions about the effects of product and 
labour market regulation on TFP growth are somewhat sensitive to the measure of 
labour market regulation included in the regression analysis. 
                                           
24 We do not show results based on a fourth measure of LMR, the Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW) Index of overall labour market regulation. While some of the individual 
components of this index may be useful, the composition of the index changes over time and 
yet the overall index for any year seems to be merely a simple average of that year’s 
components. This means that within-country variation can reflect the addition of new 
components rather than a change in flexibility.
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Table 3: Panel Regression Results for Growth in TFP – Equation (1) 
Alternative Measures of Labour Market Regulation 
Fixed-effects estimation, three 10-year blocks ending in 1983, 1993 and 2003 














PMR   t -1 –0.21 –0.10  –0.62  –0.52     
LMR   t -1 0.011  0.006  –1.56  –0.060  –0.37***   
PMR*LMR   t -1 –0.006  –0.004  0.25  0.016     
Human capital   t -1    –0.36  –0.18    
Employment/ 
population 
 t -1 
     0.0011 
 
–0.024 
    –0.026* 
 
TFP growth leader  t     0.25  0.38     
TFP gap   t -1     0.14  0.037    –0.081*** 
TFP gap*PMR   t -1    –0.023  –0.031  0.0042***   
TFP gap*LMR   t -1    –0.087*  –0.002  –0.015***   
TFP gap*PMR*LMR   t -1  
  0.015 0.0009*    0.00025***
Number of  
observations   46  47  46  47  46  47 
R
2 within
(a)   0.13 0.19  0.39 0.44 0.23  0.35 
p-value for rejecting  





















Notes:  ***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, 
respectively, using robust standard errors. All models exclude observations from 1994 to 2003 for Japan
and the Netherlands. PMR is an index from 0 (least) to 6 (most) restrictive. LMR is either EPL (which is 
an index from 0 (least) to 6 (most) restrictive) or UD (which is the percentage of employees who are 
union members). 
 (a)  The  R
2 within does not take account of the explanatory power from the constant. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has extended the existing literature on institutions and productivity in a 
number of ways. Using data covering 18 OECD countries over the period   
1974–2003, we explore the effects of product and labour market regulations on 
aggregate TFP growth for the business sector. We find some evidence that lower 
levels of regulation are associated with higher TFP growth over subsequent years. 
There is also some evidence that labour and product market deregulation have 
more of an effect in combination. That is, greater flexibility (or efficiency) in one 
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dimension appears to be more beneficial when the other market is also relatively 
flexible (efficient). It also appears that product market deregulation has a larger 
positive effect on productivity growth the further a country is from the production 
(or technological) frontier. However, these results are sensitive to changing the 
measure of labour market regulation used in our analysis. Furthermore, as with any 
econometric modelling exercise, the presence of a relationship in the past does not 
guarantee that this same relationship will necessarily continue into the future. In 
the case of regulation and productivity, the relationship is likely to depend in part 
on the specific type of labour and product market deregulation pursued. 
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Appendix A: Data Description and Sources 
TFP growth and technology gap: Construction of these variables mainly follows 
Griffith et al (2000). TFP growth in the business sector in country i at time t is 























































tfp α α α α Δ  (A1) 
where: Yit is real business sector output; Lit is aggregate hours worked, which is the 
product of business sector employment and average hours per employee; and Kit is 
the real business sector capital stock. Both Yit and Kit are rebased where necessary 
to a common year and then converted to US dollars using purchasing power parity 
(PPP) exchange rates. The rebasing uses implicit price deflators for aggregate 
output and private non-residential investment from the OECD Economic Outlook 
No 78 database. Rebased output is converted to US dollars using the 2000 PPPs 
over GDP from the OECD. The rebased capital stocks are converted to US dollars 
using 2000 PPPs over investment constructed by multiplying price indices for 
investment expenditure from Penn World Tables 6.1 by exchange rates from the 
OECD. The labour share of income is estimated by adding an approximation of 
labour’s share of gross mixed income to compensation of employees: 
 
it
it it it it it
it GDP
SE E CoE SE CoE ))] /( ( [ − +
= α  (A2) 
where:  it α is labour’s share of income in country i at time t; CoEit is compensation 
of employees; SEit is the number of self-employed people; Eit is total employment 
and GDPit is aggregate nominal GDP. We approximate average compensation of 
employees with   because the numbers of wage and salary 
earners are not available for all countries over a long enough time period. All the 
data are annual and are sourced from the OECD Economic Outlook No 78 
database. Exceptions are estimates of New Zealand business sector employment, 
which are quarterly data from the OECD Economic Outlook No 77 database, and 
components of labour’s share of income, which are annual OECD data sourced 
from Thomson Financial. 
) /( it it it SE E CoE −
                                           
25 This type of index is desirable because it can be derived directly from a flexible functional 
form. See OECD (2001) for more details. 
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The technology gap is calculated as 
  )] ln( ) [ln( 100 Lt it it TFP TFP tfpgap − =  (A3) 
where tfpgapit is the technology gap for country i at time t, and TFPit and TFPLt are 
the levels of TFP in country i and the technological leader at time t. The level of 
































where the output and capital stock have been converted to a common currency as 
described above. Variables with a bar are geometric means for all countries at time 
t, and σ it is given by 
  ) (
2
1
t it it α α σ + =  (A4) 
where α it is the LSI for country i at time t. The levels of TFP constructed with this 
index are comparable across countries, so the TFP leader can be identified and TFP 
growth in the leader (the variable  Lt tfp Δ  in Equation  (1)) calculated using 
Equation (A1). 
Product market regulations: Originally from Nicoletti et al (2001); we use the 
updated version presented in Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Countries are classified 
on a 0–6 scale from least to most restrictive for each regulatory and market feature 
of the seven non-manufacturing industries: airlines, railways, road, gas, electricity, 
post and telecommunications. Depending on the industry, the features covered are: 
barriers to entry, public ownership, market structure, vertical integration and price 
controls. Aggregate indicators for each country are simple averages of indicators 
for the seven industries and the time series run from 1975–2003. These data are 
different from the commonly cited economy-wide indicators, which are only 
available for 1998 and 2003 (Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud 2000;   
Conway, Janod and Nicoletti 2005). As the time series index is highly correlated 
with the economy-wide measure of product market regulation for the years where 
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the two overlap, it is arguably a useful time-series proxy for the stance of 
economy-wide regulation (Conway and Nicoletti 2006). 
Working days lost to labour disputes per thousand employed: Constructed from 
the number of working days lost (from the International Labour Organization) and 
the level of employment. The exceptions are: Australia – OECD Main Economic 
Indicators (MEI); Belgium – Eurostat; Canada – MEI; France – Eurostat; Germany 
– data from 1993 onwards from Eurostat; Netherlands – Eurostat; US – MEI. 
Employment data from OECD Economic Outlook, sourced from Datastream. Data 
are smoothed using a backward-looking three-year-moving average. 
Extended employment protection legislation (EPL) index: We follow Blanchard 
and Wolfers’ (1999) method of backcasting the EPL index to create a long time 
series for this indicator. Briefly, we backcast using the growth rates of a proxy, 
which is a weighted average of scaled data on severance and notice periods for a 
blue-collar worker with 10 years service. Except for the following differences, we 
follow the method outlined in Blanchard and Wolfers’ Appendix: 
•  We backcast the EPL in Nicoletti et al (2000) rather than in the OECD 
Employment Outlook (1999). The only difference between the two series is the 
choice of weights; Nicoletti and Scarpetta use factor analysis to derive the 
weights while the weights in the Outlook are chosen subjectively. The use of 
statistically derived weights seems preferable ex ante, but Nicoletti et al show 
that the two series are broadly similar and differences in the summary indicator 
are small. When constructing the weighted average of severance and notice 
periods we use the relevant weights calculated from Table 12 in Nicoletti et al 
rather than those from the Outlook. 
•  We use Addison, Teixeira and Grosso’s (2000) corrected and updated version of 
Lazear’s (1990) dataset on severance and notice pay, which has been used in a 
number of papers by its authors and others. There are few missing values in this 
updated dataset and we do not attempt to fill them. 
•  We begin backcasting the EPL using growth rates in the proxy series from 1984 
rather than from 1979. There are two countries (Denmark and the US) whose 
EPL for the ‘late 1980s’ from Nicoletti et al (2000) is positive but whose proxy 
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EPL from Addison and Grosso is zero for all years 1956–2004. We choose to set 
the pre-1985 score for these countries as zero in our backcast EPL. 
Union density: Proportion of wage and salary earners who are union members 
expressed as a percentage; both the numerator and denominator from the OECD. 
Trade union membership can be reported either by trade unions (‘administrative 
data’) or employees as part of labour force or other surveys (‘survey data’). For all 
countries in our sample except Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
UK and the US, only administrative data are available. For the remaining 
countries, survey data become available some time during our estimation period. 
Although survey data are preferable, we are wary of simply moving from 
administrative to survey data when the year in which the data source changes 
corresponds with a historically large change in calculated union density, as seems 
to be the case for Australia, Canada and the US. For these countries, we combine 
the two series in a way that avoids a historically large change in union density, for 
example by back- or forward-casting using the growth rates of administrative or 
survey data, respectively. For the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK we move from 
administrative to survey data without adjustment as this has no noticeable effect on 
calculated union density. 
Average years of schooling: Geometric interpolation of the average years of 
schooling data constructed by de la Fuente and Doménech (2002). These data are a 
revised and partially extended version of the series in de la Fuente and   
Doménech (2000). Average years of schooling are observed every five years from 
1960–1995, with the exception of France, Japan, Spain and the UK, for which 
there is no observation for 1995. We construct these observations by assuming that 
average years of schooling grew at their 1985–1990 rates over 1990–1995. 
Employment to working-age population: Business sector employment as a 
percentage of the population aged 15–64, both from the OECD Economic Outlook 
No 78 database. 
ICT expenditure: Total nominal expenditure on information technology 
(hardware, software and services) and telecommunications (equipment and 
services) as a percentage of aggregate nominal GDP. Source: WITSA (2000, 2002, 
2004). 
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Output gap: Difference between natural logarithms of actual and trend business 
sector output, where trend business sector output is real business sector GDP from 
the OECD Economic Outlook No 78 database, smoothed with a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter using a smoothing parameter of 100. When smoothing we included the 
forecasts for real business sector output for the years 2005–2007; these forecasts 
are published in the OECD Economic Outlook No 78 database. 
Research and development (R&D) expenditure: Nominal expenditure on research 
and development by the business enterprise sector as a percentage of GDP from the 
OECD’s Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI): 2006/2 edition. 
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